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Abstract 
The technology in radiation oncology has rapidly evolved over the last number of years. The increased complexity of the 
technology has brought with it increased risk. Systematic risk assessment techniques are now required to ensure the safe delivery 
of treatment with these new technologies. The risk assessment methodology proposed here combines portions of Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and human error probability modelling. The radiotherapy treatment 
process was modelled using the analysis described by Ford et al. [Medical Physics 39, no. 12 (2012): 7272-7290]. The output of 
the model is graphically represented to demonstrate the interactions and relationships between the individual tasks in the 
radiotherapy process. The components of each process were critically analysed to ascertain their fault potential. Prostate external 
beam treatment was used as a case study. The proposed methodology identified 34 error modes with the potential to affect the 
safe delivery of treatment. This method of risk analysis in radiotherapy is novel. It is highly beneficial in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the safety system currently in place in Radiotherapy. The human error probability is an estimated value which 
can vary under different conditions. The use of quantitative human error probability values enables the utilisation of 
mathematical methods to predict the effect of different interactions.. 
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1. Introduction 
Radiotherapy is common and effective treatment modality for cancer. Radiotherapy works on the radiobiological 
principle that by and large, cancer cells being treated are more sensitive to radiation damage than healthy, normal  
tissue. The treatments are fractionated to allow time for the healthy tissue to repair. The most common type of 
radiotherapy utilises beams of high energy xrays, created in a Linear Accelerator (Linac). The patient is placed on a 
bed and the machine delivers a high dose of radiation to the cancer tissue. Other types of radiotherapy exist as well 
such as electron therapy orthovoltage, brachytherapy etc., but this paper concentrates on Linac based radiotherapy. 
[1]. 
Since the introduction of Computed Tomography imaging in radiotherapy, the nature of treatments  has evolved 
rapidly. These new treatment methods result in a greater accuracy and the suitability of radiotherapy for more 
patients. Examples of developments in radiotherapy are the introduction of the multi leaf collimator (MLC) which is 
used to shape the beam around the target allowing a more accurate treatment of the cancerous lesion. Dose delivery 
to the target improved with the introduction of Intensity Modulated Radiotherapy (IMRT). This was followed by 
Image Guided Radiotherapy (IGRT) which is now used to account for intra-fraction and inter-fraction organ motion. 
Intra-fraction organ motion refers to movement of organs between treatment fractions whereas Inter-fraction organ 
motion refers to the movement of organs occurring during treatment. The direct result of all these technologies is 
that target sizes can be reduced with a concomitant reduction of radiation dose to non target (healthy) tissue.  The 
result of all these advancing technologies is a higher quality treatment with better outcome and less side effects. 
Paradoxically, the increased complexity has also lead to more room for error[2]. 
The risks surrounding the use of radiation have been well established. Between 1985-1987 a number of patients 
have been fatally injured directly arising out of their radiotherapy treatment. One of the more infamous were 
incidents with The Therac-25 Linac. The errors occurred due to the use of incorrect software.  At least 5 people died 
[3]. 
Between August 2000 and March 2001 28 patients being treated for cervix and prostate cancer were overdosed in 
Panama in which 17 were lethal. In this case a new protocol for shielding blocks was introduced involving the 
treatment planning system. The introduction of this new protocol was not validated correctly and found later to be 
incorrect [4]. In February 2001 a Linac in Bialystok (Poland) malfunctioned overdosing a number of patients.  No 
patients died from this incident however the tissue involved was seriously damaged [5]. In 2004, in France, an error 
involving the introduction of a new system for delivering wedge fields resulted in the overdose for a number of 
patients. The primary cause of this was the incorrect implementation of the wedges. Contributing factors included 
staffing levels, patient safety culture and incorrect planning [6]. In 2010 a patient in New York received a lethal 
radiation dose while being treated for tongue cancer. In this case a computer error resulted in the field size being 
reset. A large field was delivered to the patient instead of a series of small fields.   This particular incident was 
highlighted in a series of New York Times articles that highlight safety in Radiotherapy [7]. This case received a lot 
of professional and media attention. This incident resulted in a series of initiatives to discuss and implement   
methods for improving safety in modern radiotherapy. 
One way to minimize the chance of error (and thus risk) is through a rigorous Quality Assurance (QA) program. 
Quality Assurance traditionally is based on the measurement of deviations of selected machine parameters against 
specified tolerance limits. As the treatment delivery has become more complex, QA has equally become more 
complex. The focus of traditional QA on individual machine parameters without taking account of an overall 
“system view” is increasingly being called into question. It has for instance been argued that current quality 
assurance measures are outdated and in fact negatively affect patient safety [8]. The argument was made that the 
current system concentrates resources into one particular area and fails to look at the system as a whole; recognizing 
that very few errors are caused by not following rigorous QA documents and that indeed few of the tests  have little 
bearing on patient safety. The counter argument to this is that while there is a limited value to some of these tests 
they do not negatively affect patient safety. A paper by Huq et al. commented on the use of Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as tools to specify where quality assurance resources should be 
directed [9]. The approach on using a system wide, risk based approach has the ability to incorporate not just 
machine based risk factors, but also allows for the incorporation of human factors as a component of the overall risk 
profile in radiotherapy. Human factors have been shown to be involved in the majority of serious incidents in 
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radiotherapy. In this paper a system wide approach is taken, incorporating human actions as an important causal 
factor in the creation of risk 
2. Methodology 
A structured approach to risk assessment was developed based on best practice from other industries. This was 
done using a step based approach, the individual steps of which are described below.  
2.1. Graphical representation of the system 
The system is graphically represented using the process steps described by Ford et al[10] (see Fig. 1). The 
graphical representation is used to assess the process flow, the interaction of the patient with various tasks, the 
interaction of staff with tasks and the interaction of software and hardware with tasks.  
2.2. Task analysis 
The task analysis is used to analyse the parameters. They are analysed based on the potential error modes, 
contribution to treatment, input to task, output from task and where the potential error will iterate. 
2.3. Human error probability estimation (Application of SPAR-H) 
2.3.1. Nominal values 
The probability of human error (HEP) was assessed using the method SPAR-H[11]. This method was chosen due 
to its ease of use compared to other HEP techniques. SPAR was developed for the nuclear power generation 
industry. There is little evidence of the use of the SPAR-H method in healthcare. However, its potential for use in 
fields outside of nuclear power has been recognized [12]. SPAR-H divides human actions in two distinct categories, 
actions and diagnosis. An action task is a task that can be described as: 
“Guidance for action has to do with carrying out one or more activities (e.g., steps or tasks) indicated by 
diagnosis, operating rules, or written procedures.”[11] 
This is taken as having a nominal error rate of 0.001. By contrast, a diagnosis task is defined as: 
“Guidance for diagnosis has to do with attributing the most likely causes of the abnormal event to the level 
required to identify those systems or components whose status can be changed to reduce or eliminate the problem.”  
[11] 
This is taken to have a nominal error rate of 0.01. 
2.3.2. Performance shaping factors 
The performance shaping factors (PSF) are used to increase or decrease the probability of an error occurring. 
There are 8 PSFs that are discussed in the SPAR-H protocol used in this assessment. Each of the PSFs will change 
the error rate. 
 
1) Available time describes how rushed the task is. If the task has a limited amount of time to be completed then 
there is a higher probability that it won’t be completed correctly. If a task has more time to be completed there is 
a higher chance that it will be successfully completed. 
2) The stress/stressors can be represented as being either internal or external factors. There will be times when 
internal factors will affect individual stress due to factors that are outside the control of the department. However 
there are factors associated with the general layout of the department that can create a general stressful 
environment. Staffing levels, workload and personal relations within a department all can have a positive or 
negative affect on stress levels. 
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3) Complexity will depend on the task being performed. There are some parts of the radiation oncology process that 
have a high level of complexity which are more susceptible to error. This can be cancelled out by the high levels 
of training. 
4) Experience/Training is self-explanatory. As people are more highly trained and gain more experience, they will 
be more used to performing the tasks. As a consequence of this they will be less likely to make a mistake. 
5) Procedures are an assessment of the quality of the written protocols in place. Badly written procedures can lead 
to confusion and thus will increase the probability of error. 
6) Ergonomics/HMI refers to both the general ergonomics of the place of work and the HMI. The high complexity 
of the software in radiotherapy and the constant interface between the staff and the software would suggest that 
the human machine interface will play an important role in the successful completion of tasks.  
7) Fitness for duty is a variable that will change in an individual on a day to day basis. As this variable is constantly 
changing it is difficult to assess it on a macroscopic level unless there is some organizational variable that is 
affecting it.  
8) Work processes refers to the management and administrative processes. The design of the work flow and the 
patient safety climate will both influence the probability of an error occurring.  
2.3.3. Probability density functions 
The human error probability is represented as a probability density function. The subjective nature of the 
assessment means that this will be represented as a constrained non-informative prior distribution as described 
originally by Atwood [13]. In SPAR-H this is represented in the form of a Beta distribution [11]. The information 
presented in the probability density function represents the probability of human error occurring, P(x). The 
probability density function is produced using a random number generator that is weighted to produce a Beta 
distribution based on the specified alpha and Beta values for the human error of the task. The method by which the 
alpha and Beta values are calculated are documented in the SPAR-H manual [11].   
2.4. Fault tree analysis 
In order to evaluate the propagation of error the mathematics used in fault tree analysis (FTA) techniques were 
used to assess the probability reaching various stages of the process. Individual error modes occurring in 
conjunction were treated as OR gates and are represented (for two inputs) as: 
 
ܲሺܣǤ ܱܴǤܤሻ ൌ ܲሺܣሻ ൅ ܲሺܤሻ െ ܲሺܣሻܲሺܤሻ (1) 
 
Any safety checks in the system is then taken as an AND gate. This means that both the initial task and the 
checking task both have to be done incorrectly in order for an error to occur. The AND gate is represented by the 
following equation: 
 
 ܲሺܣǤ ܣܰܦǤ ܤሻ ൌ ܲሺܣሻܲሺܤሻ (2) 
 
The prior distribution is used as the input for the FTA analysis. The mathematical formalisms for the model were 
programmed in R [14]. The inputs were taken from the random number generator producing the PDFs as described 
in section 2.3.3. 
3. Results 
The full reliability model will take account of all the possible steps and tasks in the radiotherapy process. In this 
paper the results from a subset of the entire treatment process, treatment planning, is presented. Treatment planning 
is the process whereby the tumour is outlined and the radiotherapy beams are applied, following which the dose to 
tumour is calculated using computer algorithms. The treatment planning process was critically analysed on a task by 
task basis. The subtasks are identified and the potential error modes analysed.  
 
254   Gordon Sands et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  250 – 257 
Fig. 1. Graphical Representation of Treatment Planning Process. 
3.1. Graphical representation 
The tasks were assessed as either a diagnostic task or as an action task. The performance shaping factors were 
analysed in conjunction with an experienced manager of the treatment planning section. A proportion of the PSF 
variables will fluctuate depending on the person completing the task. For example a senior member of staff will be 
more trained than a junior member. The complexity of the task will be dependent on the particular treatment plan 
required. For the example presented here, a 3D conformal radiotherapy plan for a radiotherapy treatment of the 
prostate is shown.  
The process flow diagram for the planning task is shown in Fig. 1. The tasks are represented in the rectangles. 
The pictures attached to the boxes represent the involvement of staff and software involved in the treatment. The 
small square colours represent the type of error that can potentially occur as a result of unsuccessful completion of 
the task.  
3.2. Task analysis 
The diagram above allows for a generic task analysis for external beam planning based on the tasks described in 
[10]. The majority of these tasks will apply to all external beam treatments, although for some treatments there 
maybe changes. For the purposes of this example the prostate treatment is used as an example. A summary of the 
task analysis can be seen in Figure 2. The tasks were not all applicable to the department being evaluated. Figure 2 
is colour coded based on the task. The colour code is summarised next to the figure. A quality event refers to a task 
that could have an effect on the quality of the plan but may not always be considered an incident.  
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Fig. 2. Summary of Task Analysis. Probability, alpha and beta coefficients from SPAR-H [11]. 
Following the task analysis the potential error modes were identified. Any error modes that result in an interlock 
of the system are not included, ie. if the error has no potential of affecting patient treatment but rather will prevent 
future tasks from being completed, it won’t affect the patient but rather it will stop the process from being 
completed. The potential error modes for each task were identified and the effects of them on the full process. 
Across the 16 tasks identified based on the Ford paper a total of 34 potential error modes were identified. This 
includes the human error probability of a check not working correctly. The highest HEP value was 0.02, or 2 in 100 
patients. This does not mean that this many patients will be mistreated. The value presented here is what happens 
prior to the pretreatment safety checks. These safety checks should reduce the amount of patients affected by the 
patient error. 
3.3. Human error probability  
The probability density functions were developed as described in the previous section. An example of one of 
them can be seen in Fig. 3. The example shown is that of an error of choosing a wrong normalization point in the 
treatment plan. The mean value for this human error probability was calculated to be 0.02 (represented by the blue 
line in Fig. 3). This was calculated from a Beta distribution for the 34 error modes identified. The mean value, alpha 
value and Beta value are all shown in Figure 2. This was compared to the number of such events which occurred 
over a 12 month period (collected as part of a Quality Assurance database). An analysis of the actual error rates 
revealed an error rate of 0.017 for this task (represented by the green line in Fig. 3). 
 
  












Fig. 3. Probability density function of the Human Error Probability of one particular task (an unsuitable normalisation point being used). 
Fig. 4. Probability density function of the Human Error Probability of the overall treatment planning process. 
3.4. Fault tree analysis 
The PDF for all the error modes and safety checks were analysed for the task being investigated. Potential error 
modes were treated as OR gates while safety checks on any given error mode were taken as AND gates. The PDFs 
for the various tasks were then mathematically analysed producing a single PDF for the overall error probability of 
the treatment planning process. The overall PDF of an error occurring at the treatment planning process can be seen 
in Fig. 4. 
The result of the calculated error probability show that typically 8% of treatment plans contain an error in any of 
the 34 identified error modes of the process. This is of course unacceptable and explains the necessity of 
independent error checking in the treatment planning process. It should not come as a surprise that such independent 
checking is common place in most radiotherapy departments. 
4. Discussion 
The model can be used to critically analyse the safety of a system. It is loosely based on tools from the nuclear 
industry such as SPAR-H and tools such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA). Applying human error probability adds a quantitative approach. The inclusion of extra safety barriers and 
the effect of them on the probability of an incident occurring can be modelled using this method. This can be used to 
concentrate resources in areas where risk is higher. The model presented in this paper is a small sample of a larger 
risk model that evaluates the complete external beam radiation therapy process. There are a number of advantages to 
modeling error modes and error propagation; 
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x It allows for a quantitative approach to probability of incidents 
x Error propagation and the interaction between tasks is clearer 
x The baseline model produced can be easily adapted to other departments and or changed circumstances 
 
As a possible disadvantage it can be argued that any model of Human Error Probability has a high level of 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, preliminary comparison of calculated error rates, with those actually found in this study 
show good agreement, leading us to have some confidence in the model. The model presented in this paper offers a 
solution to the on-going debate of addressing human error probability in healthcare/radiotherapy. The model takes 
performance shaping factors into consideration. It has been well established from the nuclear industry that taking 
large numbers of Performance Shaping Factors creates unrealistically small values for human error probabilities.  In 
order to address this, other human error assessment methods limit the number of PSFs that can be included in the 
overall analysis. This will be the subject of further work. 
5. Conclusions 
This research demonstrates a systematic technique for process modelling with an emphasis on task analysis and 
safety. It evaluates the full treatment process thus ensuring patient safety. Calculating the effects of error 
propagation ensures that the system is assessed as a whole rather than as a series of isolated (sub-) systems. This 
model, although developed for radiotherapy, can be adapted to other well defined clinical processes. It offers a 
unique method to performing a full safety system analysis that can be used to ensure all clinical developments are 
safe prior to use. 
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